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intermediation in international trade †

Wholesalers and Retailers in US Trade
By Andrew B. Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding,
and Peter K. Schott*
International trade models typically assume
that producers in one country trade directly
with final consumers in another. In the real
world, of course, trade can involve long chains
of potentially independent actors who move
goods through wholesale and retail distribution
networks. These networks likely affect the magnitude and nature of trade frictions and hence
both the pattern of trade and its welfare gains.
To promote further understanding of how goods
move across borders, this paper examines the
extent to which US exports and imports flow
through wholesalers and retailers versus “producing and consuming” firms. We highlight a
number of stylized facts about these intermediaries and show that their attributes can deviate
substantially from the portrait of trading firms

that has emerged from microdata in recent
years.1
I. Data

Our results focus on 2002, but we note that
results for other years are similar. We use the US
Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction
Database (LFTTD), which matches individual US trade transactions to US firms in the
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD).2 For
each export and import transaction, we observe
the US-based firm engaging in the transaction,
the ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) classification of the product shipped, the value shipped,
the shipment date, the destination or source
country, and whether the transaction takes place
at “arm’s length” or between “related parties.”  3
For imports, we also observe an identifier for the
foreign manufacturer or shipper, and we use this
field to identify each importer’s number of foreign “partner firms.” Via the LBD, we observe
firms’ employment according to the major industry of each of its establishments. This information allows us to compute the share of firms’ US
employment across nine broad sectors, including wholesale and retail (NAICS sectors 42 and
44 to 45, respectively). Firms with only a single

†
Discussants: Donald Davis, Columbia University;
David Atkin, Yale University; James Tybout, Pennsylvania
State University; Jonathan Eaton, Pennsylvania State
University.
*
Bernard: Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
and NBER, 100 Tuck Hall, Hanover, NH 03755 (e-mail:
andrew.b.bernard@tuck.dartmouth.edu); Jensen: George
town University and NBER, 521 Hariri, McDonough
School of Business, Washington, DC 20057 (e-mail:
jbj24@georgetown.edu); Redding: London School of
Economics and CEPR, Houghton Street, London WC2A
2AE UK (e-mail: s.j.redding@lse.ac.uk); Schott: Yale
School of Management and NBER, 135 Prospect Street,
New Haven, CT 06520 (e-mail: peter.schott@yale.edu).
Bernard thanks the European University Institute, Schott
(SES-0550190) and Jensen (SES-0552029) thank the NSF,
and Redding thanks the ESRC-funded Centre for Economic
Performance for financial support. We are grateful to Don
Davis for helpful comments. The research in this paper was
conducted at the US Census Research Data Centers, and
support from NSF (ITR-0427889) is acknowledged gratefully. We thank Daniel Reyes for research assistance and
Jim Davis for speedy disclosure. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the views of the NSF or the US
Census Bureau. Results have been reviewed to ensure that
no confidential information is disclosed.

1

A longer version of this working paper is available in
an online Appendix and from the authors’ Web sites. For
theoretical explanations of intermediation see James E.
Rauch and Joel Watson (2004), Bernardo Blum, Sebastian
Claro, and Ig Horstmann (2008), Anders Akerman (2010),
JaeBin Ahn, Amit Khandelwal, and Shang-Jin Wei (2010),
Pol Antràs and Arnaud Costinot (2010) and Dimitra
Petropoulou (2007).
2
We link 80 percent of transactions by value; see
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) for more details.
3
Ownership thresholds for relatedness are ten percent
(exports) and six percent (imports).
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Table 1—Distribution of Firm Types and the Trade Value
for Which They Account, 2002
Exporting firms
Firm
type

Share of
firms

W
R
PC
MWR
MPC

0.34
0.09
0.52
0.01
0.04

Importing firms

Share of Share of China
export product- value
value
countries share
0.08
0.01
0.22
0.02
0.67

0.45
0.08
0.58
0.11
0.60

0.05
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.04

Share of Share of Share of China
importing import product- value
firms
value
countries share
0.42
0.13
0.40
0.01
0.04

0.15
0.01
0.21
0.08
0.55

0.53
0.18
0.56
0.18
0.55

0.21
0.35
0.07
0.30
0.06

Notes: First two columns of each panel report a breakdown of firms and the share of value for
which they account; these columns sum to unity. Second two columns of each panel report the
share of all US product-country cells in which each type of firm is present, and the share of
trade value with China in total trade value for each firm type. Zeros are due to rounding. Data
are for 2002.

US establishment necessarily have 100 percent
employment in a single sector.
We distinguish between two categories of
“pure” intermediaries: pure wholesalers (W),
who have 100 percent of their US employment
in wholesaling, and pure retailers (R), who
have 100 percent of their US employment in
retailing.4 We compare W and R to two other
types of firms: “pure” producers or consumers
(PC), which have zero wholesale and retail
employment, and “mixed” firms, which have
wholesale plus retail employment between 0
and 100 percent. We explore the ramifications
of using a sharp 100 percent cutoff in defining W and R firms by further dividing mixed
firms into “mixed wholesale-retail” (MWR) and
“mixed producer-consumer” (MPC) according
to whether wholesaling plus retailing in these
firms accounts for more or less than 75 percent
of employment. Together, W, R, PC, MWR, and
MPC firms are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Unfortunately, we cannot compare firms
in the LFTTD to those which trade “indirectly”
via wholesalers or retailers, as we do not observe
the latter’s sales or purchases within the United
States.
Table 1 reports a breakdown of trading firms
and value by type of firm for 2002. Collectively,
pure wholesalers and retailers account for

large shares of trading firms but relatively little value, with wholesalers being around four
times more prevalent and responsible for considerably more trade than retailers. PC firms
are most numerous on the export side and as
numerous as Ws on the import side and represent roughly one fifth of export and import
value. Mixed firms are rarest but account for
the majority of trade. This dominance is stronger for exports than imports, though MWR
importers are relatively more important for
imports than for exports. The country composition of trade also varies substantially across
firm types and between exports and imports,
with trade with China accounting for by far the
largest share of total trade for W, R, and MWR
importers.5
II. Wholesaler and Retailer “Premia”

It is well known that trading firms differ from
purely domestic firms along a number of dimensions. Here, we demonstrate substantial heterogeneity within trading firms.
Table 2 reports non-PC firms’ “premia” relative to PC firms’ in 2002. Each cell reports the
result of a different firm- (top panel) or firm-product-country- (bottom panel) level OLS regression
of the noted characteristic on a dummy variable

4

Most—but not all—of the pure firms are singleestablishment firms. Firms with employment split between
wholesale and retail are allocated to W or R according to
whichever is higher.

5
See Emek Basker and Pham Hoang Van (2008a,b) for
further evidence of the contribution of retailers to import
growth from China.
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Table 2—“Premia” Relative to PC Firms, 2002
Exporting firms
W

Firm-level OLS regressions
ln(Employment f)
ln(Value f )
ln(Countries f)
ln(Products f)
ln(Partners f)
ln(Mean PCGDP f)

R

−0.91***
0.01

−0.80***
0.03

−0.01
0.01
0.06***
0.01
na

−0.05***
0.01

−0.13***
0.01

0.02**
0.01

−0.02***
0.00

−0.02**
0.01

−0.02**
0.01
na

Firm-product-country-level OLS regressions
0.00
ln(Value fpc)
−0.09***
0.00
0.01
ln(Unit value fpc)

ln(RP sharefpc)

−0.14***
0.01

−0.83***
0.07

−0.08***
0.01
0.61***
0.15

Importing firms

MWR

MPC

2.67***
0.06
0.11***
0.02
0.14***
0.02
0.31***
0.03
na

2.76***
0.05
0.50***
0.02
0.40***
0.03
0.52***
0.03
na

0.01
0.02
−0.16***
0.01

−0.17***
0.01
4.08***
0.25

W

R

−1.16***
0.02
0.00
0.00

−0.96***
0.04

0.04***
0.02

−0.18***
0.01

−0.04**
0.02

0.19***
0.01

−0.08***
0.01
0.02**
−0.20***
0.01
0.01
3.44***
1.63***
0.11
0.14

−0.06***
0.01
10.58***
0.11

−0.08***
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.03***
0.01

0.16***
0.01

−0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.13***
0.02
0.09***
0.01

MWR

MPC

2.80***
0.08
0.29***
0.03
0.28***
0.02
0.46***
0.03
0.54***
0.03

2.77***
0.04
0.35***
0.03
0.38***
0.02
0.39***
0.02
0.49***
0.02
0.11***
0.02

0.62***
0.01

0.29***
0.01
0.03***
0.01
7.06***
0.13

−0.05**
0.03

−0.03***
0.01
0.14
0.16

Notes: Each cell reports the results of a different OLS regression of noted characteristic on a dummy variable for noted firm
type versus PC firms. Top- (bottom-) panel regressions include major six-digit HS category (product-country) fixed effects.
All regressions except those in first row control for firm size (see text). Robust standard errors clustered according to the fixed
effects are reported below coefficients. Data are for 2002.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.

for the noted firm type. Each regression sample
includes all firms of the noted type as well as PC
firms. Regressions in the top panel include major
six-digit HS category fixed effects as well as controls for firm employment deciles (except in the
first row). Regressions summarized in the bottom
panel include product-country fixed effects and
analogous controls for firm size.
Firm-level attributes considered in the top
panel of Table 2 include domestic employment,
total trade value, the number of country partners,
the number of products traded and the number
of foreign partner firms.6 Firm-product-country
attributes considered in the bottom panel of
the table include value, unit value (i.e., value

divided by quantity), and share of value with
related parties.
Relative to PC firms, W and R exporters and
importers have lower employment and, within
size deciles, trade less value but trade more products per country.7 MWR exporters and importers, in contrast, are substantially larger than
PC firms: they trade more products, trade with
more countries, trade more products per country and, on the import side, interact with more
foreign partner firms, though only W importers
trade with more foreign partners per product per
country than PC firms. MPC firms are also relatively large; they trade significantly more value
at the product-country level than PC firms and

6

The coefficient in the first cell of the top panel, for
example, indicates that exporting wholesalers have on
average 60 percent (1 − e−0.91 ) of the employment of PC
firms.

7
Manipulation of the coefficients in Table 2 allows comparison of products per country and, on the import side,
foreign firms per product per country.

VOL. 100 NO. 2

Wholesalers and Retailers in US Trade

are substantially more likely to engage in trade
with related parties. W, R, and MWR importers all trade with countries with a lower average
GDP per capita than PC firms do.
Results with respect to unit values are less
clear. Perhaps intuitively, W, R, and MWR
exporters have relatively low unit values within
product-country cells and firm size deciles than
either MPC or PC firms. On the other hand,
while W and MWR importers have relatively
low unit values, we find that R importers have
relatively high unit values.
III. Product-Country Determinants of
Intermediation

The third column of each panel in Table 1
reveals that R and MWR firms participate in
fewer product-country markets than W, PC, and
MPC firms. Even among the latter, however,
participation is well below 100 percent. In this
section, we examine product and country characteristics that influence market participation.
We correlate the share of trade value
accounted for by each type of firm across products. As reported in our online Appendix, two
features stand out. First, intermediaries’ correlations with nonintermediaries are negative for
both exports and imports, indicating these firms
specialize in different sets of goods. Second, the
shares of product trade due to PC versus MPC
firms are also negatively correlated. This result
suggests producer and consumer firms may
develop in-house wholesaling or retailing capabilities depending on the products they produce,
or vice versa.
In our online Appendix, we report the share of
export and import value accounted for by each
type of firm across two-digit HS categories. Pure
wholesalers tend to concentrate in agriculturerelated sectors such as Animal and Vegetable
products in both exports and imports. PCs and
MPCs, on the other hand, focus more on industries more likely to contain differentiated goods,
such as Transportation. Among importers, we
find that MWRs are disproportionately active in
Textiles, Clothing, and Footwear. Correlations
between the product value shares of exporters
versus importers within firm types are positive
and statistically significant.
Finally, as reported in our online Appendix,
we find that the share of exports and imports
mediated by pure wholesalers declines with
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market size, from 0.20 (0.25) for the smallest
quintile of destination (source) markets to 0.07
(0.14) for the largest. Pure wholesalers therefore
have relatively greater penetration of small markets, whereas for MPC firms we find the opposite pattern.
IV. Gravity

A long line of research in international trade
highlights the importance of “gravity” in determining trade flows. Here, we examine the role
of country characteristics in influencing market
participation by estimating gravity equations for
each firm type.
Table 3 reports the results of two country-level
OLS regressions. In the top panel, log aggregate
trade value for each type of firm is regressed on
partner countries’ log GDP and log great-circle
distance from the United States (in km).8 In the
second panel, the “extensive” component of
log value, i.e., the log number of firm-product
observations with positive trade, is regressed
on these variables. The difference between the
coefficients in the top and bottom panels is the
contribution of the “intensive” component of log
value, i.e., the log average value per firm-product
observation with positive trade. Explicit results
for the intensive margin, and for pure retailers,
are available in our online Appendix.
Results for exports are straightforward: trade
value falls with distance and rises with market size. Moreover, gravity’s stronger effect on
extensive versus intensive margins across the
board is consistent with recent research on the
margins of trade. Comparing the coefficient on
GDP across columns, we find W trade is less
sensitive to market size than MPC trade, consistent with the former’s declining market share
across GDP quintiles noted above. This differential response is disproportionately due to the
intensive margin. The difference in coefficients
on log GDP between MWR and MPC firms versus other types of firms is larger for the intensive
margin than the extensive margin.
Results for imports are less conventional.
While we find the expected positive relationship between market size and import value,

8
These data are from the World Bank and CEPII,
respectively. The mean (standard deviation) of these variables are 25 (2) and 8 (0.7), respectively.
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Table 3—Country-Level Gravity, 2002
Exports
W

PC

−1.55***
0.21
0.93***
0.04
8.95***
2.13

−1.33***
0.17
0.92***
0.04
8.02***
1.84

Imports
MWR

MPC

W

PC

MWR

MPC

ln(Value)
ln(Distancec)
ln(GDPc)
Constant
Observations
R2

173
0.76

ln(Extensive margin)
ln(Distancec )
ln(GDPc )
Constant
Observations
R2

−1.66***
0.19
0.73***
0.04
3.62*
2.01

175
0.74

−1.28***
0.14
0.82***
0.03
−1.36
1.70

173
0.75

175
0.79

−1.64*** −1.42***
0.24
0.20
1.03***
1.13***
0.06
0.04
5.07*
4.67**
2.72
2.06
157
0.66

−1.67***
0.21
0.74***
0.04
1.37
2.24
157
0.68

174
0.81

−1.28***
0.17
0.80***
0.04
−1.01
1.88
174
0.73

−0.31
0.23
1.15***
0.05

−6.7***
2.30
171
0.72

−1.19***
0.26
1.27***
0.05
−1.6
2.70

0.24
−0.99***
0.41
0.26
1.28*** 1.28***
0.10
0.06

−16.1*** −3.1
4.00
2.83

172
0.73

−0.20
0.18
0.97***
0.04

−0.73***
0.16
0.96***
0.04

−15.5***
1.80

−10.7***
1.77

171
0.74

172
0.79

147
0.53

170
0.69

0.37
−0.72***
0.24
0.16
0.93*** 0.97***
0.06
0.04

−21.1*** −11.0***
2.25
1.73
147
0.60

170
0.79

Notes: Table reports country-level OLS regressions for two dependent variables: log aggregate value per country (top panel)
and log number of firm-product observations with positive trade per country (bottom panel). Robust standard errors reported
below coefficients. Data are for 2002.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.

distance has a negative and statistically significant relationship with import value and the
extensive margin only for PC and MPC firms.
For intermediaries, the relationship is negative
but statistically insignificant for Ws and positive
but statistically insignificant for Rs and MWRs.
One factor contributing to this result is the relatively heavy concentration of Rs and MWRs in
consumer goods (e.g., footwear) that are disproportionately imported from far-away China, as
reflected in the results reported in Tables 1 and
2. Indeed, across two-digit HS categories, R
and MWR importers’ value shares are strongly
positively correlated with China’s import market shares. Analogous correlations with respect
to PC and MPC firms’ shares are statistically
insignificant but negative.

“stylized” trading firm emphasized in much
of the recent literature in international trade.
While pure wholesalers are relatively numerous,
they are on average smaller than pure producers and account for a relatively small share of
trade value. While pure wholesalers are concentrated in agriculture-related sectors, pure producers and mixed firms are more prevalent in
industries more likely to contain differentiated
goods, such as transportation. Pure wholesalers
are relatively less sensitive to market size and
import disproportionately from China and other
low-wage countries. Together with differences
in product specialization, this leads to departures on the import side from the standard gravity equation predictions for trade.

V. Conclusions

REFERENCES

Trading firms exhibit substantial heterogeneity and can be quite different from the

Ahn, J.B., Amit Khandelwal, and Shang-Jin
Wei. 2010. “The Role of Intermediaries in

VOL. 100 NO. 2

Wholesalers and Retailers in US Trade

 acilitating Trade.” National Bureau of EcoF
nomic Research Working Paper 15706.
Akerman, Anders. 2010. “A Theory on the Role
of Wholesalers in International Trade Based
on Economics of Scope.” Research Paper in
Economics, Stockholm University, 2010:1.
Antrás, Pol, and Arnaud Costinot. 2010. “Intermediated Trade.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 15750.
Basker, Emek, and Pham Hoang Van. 2008a.
“Imports ‘R’ US: Retail Chains as Platforms
for Developing County Imports.” Unpublished.
Basker, Emek, and Pham Hoang Van. 2008b.
“Wal-mart as Catalyst to U.S.-China Trade.”
Unpublished.
Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen, and
Peter K. Schott. 2009. “Importers, Exporters

413

and Multinationals: A Portrait of Firms in the
U.S. that Trade Goods.” In Producer Dynamics: New Evidence from Micro Data, ed. Timothy Dunne, J. Bradford Jensen, and Mark J.
Roberts, 133–63. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Blum, Bernardo S., Ig Horstmann, and Sebastian Claro. 2008. “Intermediation and the

Nature of Trade Costs: Theory and Evidence.”
Unpublished.
Petropoulou, Dimitra. 2007. “Information Costs,
Networks and Intermediation in International
Trade.” University of Oxford Department of
Economics Discussion Paper 370.
Rauch, James E., and Joel Watson. 2004. “Network Intermediaries in International Trade.”
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 13(1): 69–93.

This article has been cited by:
1. P. Antras, A. Costinot. 2011. Intermediated Trade. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126:3,
1319-1374. [CrossRef]
2. JaeBin Ahn, Amit K. Khandelwal, Shang-Jin Wei. 2011. The role of intermediaries in facilitating
trade#. Journal of International Economics . [CrossRef]

